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Conflict of Interests and Related Parties

We consider that Gilead became a related party of Galapagos NV in 2019 because of (i) Gilead’s then 25.84% shareholding (25.35% on December 31, 2024) in Galapagos NV, and (ii) the fact that Gilead is entitled to propose two candidates to be appointed to the Board of Directors of Galapagos NV under the share subscription agreement dated July 14, 2019, as amended.

On January 7, 2025, we entered into a related party transaction with Gilead within the meaning of article 7:97 of the Belgian Companies Code, by entering into various transaction documents, including the separation agreement, linked to the planned separation of Galapagos into two publicly listed entities (the “Transaction”).

The Board of Directors applied the related party transaction approval procedure as set forth in article 7:97 of the Belgian Companies Code. Within the context of this procedure, a committee of three Independent members of the Board of Directors of Galapagos (the “Committee”) issued an advice to the Board of Directors in which the Committee assessed the separation of Galapagos in two publicly listed legal entities and the hereto related transaction documents. The Committee was assisted by Lazard as an independent expert (the “Expert”) and Allen Overy Shearman Sterling. In its advice to the Board of Directors, the Committee concluded the following: “In light of article 7:97 of the BCAC, the Committee has performed, with the assistance of the Expert, a thorough analysis of the Proposed Resolutions. This assessment included a detailed analysis of the Transaction embedded in these Proposed Resolutions, an analysis of the financial impact and other consequences thereof, an identification of the advantages and disadvantages to the Company, as well as an assessment how these fit in the Company’s strategy.  Based on such assessment, the Committee believes that the Proposed Resolutions and the Transaction embedded therein are in the interest of the Company, given the balance between benefits and risks that the Transaction represents and the potential to alter the Company’s strategic status quo and accelerate value creation for all shareholders.”. The Board of Directors did not deviate from the Committee’s advice.

The assessment by the statutory auditor of Galapagos of the advice of the Committee and the minutes of the Board of Directors is as follows: “Based on our review, nothing has come to our attention that causes us to believe that the financial and accounting data reported in the advice of the Ad Hoc committee of the independent members of the board of directors dated on 7 January 2025 and in the minutes of the board of directors dated on 7 January 2025, which justify the proposed transaction, are not consistent, in all material respects, compared to the information we possess in the context of our mission. Our mission is solely executed for the purposes described in article 7:97 CCA and therefore our report may not be used for any other purpose.”

A more detailed explanation of some of our transactions with Gilead can be found in the section titled Agreements with major Galapagos NV shareholders. We further refer to note 32.

In the event of a transaction where a member of the Board of Directors has a conflict of interests within the meaning of article 7:96 of the Belgian Companies Code, such Board member shall notify the Board of Directors in advance of the respective conflict, and will act in accordance with the relevant rules as set out in the Belgian Companies Code.

Pursuant to our Corporate Governance Charter, if a member of the Executive Committee has a direct or indirect interest of a monetary nature that conflicts with the interests of the Company in respect of a decision or an act falling within the scope of the responsibilities of the Executive Committee, the Executive Committee shall refrain from making any decision. The Executive Committee shall instead escalate the matter to the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors shall decide whether or not to approve such decision or act, and shall apply the conflict of interests procedure set out in article 7:96 of the Belgian Companies Code. In the event a conflict of interest exists within the Executive Committee that falls outside of the scope of article 7:96 of the Belgian Companies Code, the existence of such conflict shall be reported by the relevant Executive Committee member, its existence shall be included in the minutes (but shall not be published) and the relevant Executive Committee member shall not vote on the matter.

In addition to the above, the Company’s Corporate Governance Charter and Related Person Transaction Policy contain certain procedures for transactions between Galapagos NV (including its affiliated and associated companies within the meaning of articles 1:20 and 1:21 of the Belgian Companies Code) and its Board members, Executive Committee members, major shareholders, or any of their immediate family members and affiliates. Without prejudice to the procedures as set out in the applicable laws, these policies provide (among others) that all transactions between Galapagos NV (including its affiliated and associated companies within the meaning of articles 1:20 and 1:21 of the Belgian Companies Code) and any of its Board members or Executive Committee members, need the approval of the Audit Committee and the Board of Directors, which approval can only be provided for transactions at arm’s length. Moreover, conflicts of interests, even if they are not a conflict of interests within the meaning of article 7:96 of the Belgian Companies Code, are enacted in the Board of Directors’ meeting minutes (but shall not be published), and the relevant Board member cannot participate in the deliberation or voting on the concerned item on the agenda.

In 2024 until the publication of this annual report, the following conflicts of interests between Galapagos NV and a Director within the meaning of article 7:96 of the Belgian Companies Code were noted:

  • In a meeting of the Board of Directors held on February 19, 2024, the following was reported in connection with the proposed 2023 corporate funding decision:

    Pursuant to section 7:96 of the Belgian Code of Companies and Associations, and to the extent required, the following was reported in connection with the 2023 corporate funding decision: the Chair declared that he had informed the Board of Directors of a potential conflict of interest of the Chair concerning the 2023 corporate funding decision, as this will form the base for the available bonus pool for the Executive Committee members, including the Chair as CEO. After discussion, the Board decided that a funding of 90% was justified and reasonable in view of the 2023 achievements and will have no material impact on the financial position of the Company, and in line with the recommendation of the Remuneration Committee, approved the 90% funding. The Chair did not take part in the deliberation and the vote concerning this decision.
  • In a meeting of the Board of Directors held on February 19, 2024, the following was reported in connection with the proposed compensation of the CEO (2023 cash bonus and 2024 salary increase):

    Pursuant to section 7:96 of the Belgian Code of Companies and Associations, the following was reported in connection with the proposed compensation of the CEO (2023 cash bonus and 2024 salary increase): the Chair declared that he had informed the Board of Directors of a potential conflict of interest concerning the proposed compensation of the Chair as CEO, incl. amendment of his management agreement as regards the salary increase. After discussion, the Board decided that the proposed compensation was a justified reward for the results achieved by the CEO in 2023 and will have no material impact on the financial position of the Company, and in line with the recommendation from the Remuneration Committee, approved the proposed compensation. The Chair did not take part in the deliberation and the vote concerning this decision.
  • In a meeting of the Board of Directors held on March 26, 2024, the following was reported in connection with the proposed grants of subscription rights and RSUs to the CEO under the 2024 plans:

    Pursuant to section 7:96 of the Belgian Companies Code, the following was reported in connection with the proposed grants of subscription rights and RSUs to the CEO under the 2024 plans: the Chair informed the Board of Directors of a conflict of interest, concerning the proposed grants of subscription rights and RSUs to the CEO under the 2024 plans. The Board considered that said compensation was a justified reward for the results achieved by the CEO in 2023, in line with the contractual arrangement with the CEO executed in 2022 and with the Company’s Remuneration Policy. Furthermore, the Board deemed the proposed grants to be an important tool in the retention of Stoffels IMC BV as CEO of the Company and considered that these grants have no material impact on the financial position of the Company. The Board shared the opinion of the Remuneration Committee that the proposed compensation is justified and reasonable. The Chair did not take part in the deliberation and the vote concerning this decision.
  • In a meeting of the Board of Directors held on May 16, 2024, the following was reported in connection with the proposed issuance of the 2024 subscription right plans:

    The CEO and also Chair of the Board of Directors, Stoffels IMC BV, reported prior to this meeting that he had a conflict of interest within the meaning of article 7:96 of the Belgian Companies Code in connection with the issuance of the number of subscription rights under the Subscription Right Plan 2024 BE, Subscription Right Plan 2024 RMV, and Subscription Right Plan 2024 ROW, for the benefit of employees of the Company and its subsidiaries, with cancellation of the preferential subscription right of the existing shareholders in the framework of the issuance of these subscription rights and the related possible future capital increase, as the CEO will be a beneficiary under Subscription Right Plan 2024 BE. The Board of Directors, upon the recommendation of the Remuneration Committee, is of the opinion that the proposed agenda items and the proposed grant of subscription rights to the CEO are consistent with the Company’s Remuneration Policy and are justified and reasonable. The nature of the proposed decision and the financial impact on the Company are described in more detail in the above-mentioned special report of the Board of Directors. In accordance with the procedure provided for in article 7:96 of the Belgian Companies Code, the CEO and also Chair of the Board of Directors, Stoffels IMC BV, does not attend this meeting and will not take part in the deliberation and the vote.
  • In a meeting of the Board of Directors held on September 24, 2024, the following was reported in connection with the proposed grant of the tax recuperation mechanism to Stoffels IMC BV in connection with the 2022 sign-on grant of subscription rights to Stoffels IMC BV in its capacity of CEO:

    The CEO and also Chair of the Board of Directors, Stoffels IMC BV, reported that it had a conflict of interest within the meaning of article 7:96 of the Belgian Companies Code regarding the grant of the tax recuperation mechanism to Stoffels IMC BV in connection with the 2022 sign-on grant of subscription rights to Stoffels IMC BV in its capacity of CEO. The Board of Directors, upon recommendation of the Remuneration Committee, is of the opinion that the proposed grant is in line with the contractual arrangement with the CEO executed in 2022 and is justified and reasonable. Furthermore, the Board, upon recommendation of the Remuneration Committee, considered that this grant has no material impact on the financial position of the Company. In accordance with article 7:96 of the Belgian Companies Code, the CEO and also Chair of the Board of Directors, Stoffels IMC BV, was not present during the discussion of this agenda topic and did not take part in the deliberation and the vote.
  • In a meeting of the Board of Directors held on January 7, 2025, the following was reported in connection with the proposed entering by Galapagos into various agreements with Gilead:

    Prior to the Board proceeding to the deliberation and decision-making, the Chair pointed out that, given that the Board must resolve on the Transaction that qualifies as a related party transaction under article 7:97 of the BCAC due to Gilead acting as a counterparty and qualifying as a related party within the meaning of IAS 24, Dr. Linda Higgins and Andrew Dickinson could be viewed as ‘directors concerned’ or otherwise conflicted within the meaning of article 7:96 of the BCAC, in respect of the Transaction and the corresponding items on the agenda. The Chair pointed out that the procedure set out in article 7:97 of the BCAC was applied in the context of the Transaction with Gilead, with respect to agenda topic 2. These resolutions were submitted to a Committee of Independent Directors (the “Committee”) for their prior advice. The Committee was composed of the following Independent Directors: (i) Mr. Jérôme Contamine, (ii) Dr. Elisabeth Svanberg, (iii) Mr. Simon Sturge. The Committee was assisted by Lazard, who acted as an independent expert within the meaning of article 7:97 of the BCAC. After the introduction by the Chair, Linda Higgins and Andrew Dickinson, given that they are direct or indirect representatives of Gilead, recused themselves from the deliberation and decision-making prior to the Board proceeding with agenda topics 2.1 and following.
  • In a meeting of the Board of Directors held on February 11, 2025, the following was reported in connection with the proposed 2024 corporate funding decision:

    Pursuant to section 7:96 of the Belgian Code of Companies and Associations, and to the extent required, the following was reported in connection with the 2024 corporate funding decision: the Chair declared that he had informed the Board of Directors of a potential conflict of interest of the Chair concerning the 2024 corporate funding decision, as this will form the base for the available bonus pool for the Executive Committee members, including the Chair as CEO. After discussion, the Board decided that a funding of 77% was justified and reasonable in view of the 2024 achievements and will have no material impact on the financial position of the Company, and in line with the recommendation of the Remuneration Committee, approved the 77% funding. The Chair did not take part in the deliberation and the vote concerning this decision.
  • In a meeting of the Board of Directors held on February 11, 2025, the following was reported in connection with the proposed compensation of the CEO (2024 cash bonus):

    Pursuant to section 7:96 of the Belgian Code of Companies and Associations, the following was reported in connection with the proposed compensation of the CEO (2024 cash bonus): the Chair declared that he had informed the Board of Directors of a potential conflict of interest concerning the proposed compensation of the Chair as CEO. After discussion, the Board decided that the proposed compensation was a justified reward for the results achieved by the CEO in 2024 and will have no material impact on the financial position of the Company, and in line with the recommendation from the Remuneration Committee, approved the proposed compensation. The Chair did not take part in the deliberation and the vote concerning this decision.